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Introduction
Every day, thousands of opinion polls, corporate surveys,
consumer panels, government feedback forms, and psychological
rating scales are employed to elicit the attitudes of humankind. But
what is that is being measured with these instruments? Given the
ubiquitous use of survey and polling instruments it seems we ought
to have firm answers to this fundamental question, but un-
fortunately we do not [1–4].
The typical approach to the issue is to focus on the predictive
utility of the statements people make (irrespective of whether to
call them attitudes, opinions, preferences, or evaluations).
Hence, psychologists have long been troubling over the fact
that what we say often does not predict what we do, and have
tried different methodological twists to close the gap between
attitudes and behavior [5–7]. Even less optimistically, in the
debate over stated vs. revealed preferences, economists have
often made wholesale dismissals of stated preferences in favor of
market decisions [8–10].
Ideally, what researchers would like to have is a method that
measured the propensity for consistency or change at the very
moment of the poll (something that allows us to pre-emptively
jump the attitude-behavior gap, so to speak). The standard way to
approximate this goal is to complement a survey with meta-
attitudinal judgements, such as perceived certainty or importance
[11,12]. These tools add to our predictive edge, but meta-
attitudinal judgments have a tendency to fractionate into a grab
bag of different factors and processes when closely scrutinized
[13,14]. In short, asking people to introspect and estimate their
own propensity for change often assumes more self-awareness than
is warranted from the evidence [4,15–18]. Another possibility is to
add some form of implicit measure, typically based on response
latency [19,20]. Again, this is helpful, but there is only so much
information you can glean in a brief 100 msec reaction time
window [21].
Yet, why do we have to conceive of attitude measurements
primarily as reports, and not a form of interactive test or
experiment? What would happen if we engaged more directly
with the attitudes at hand, perhaps even challenged them?
Using the phenomenon of Choice Blindness (CB) as a wedge, we
have been able to separate the decisions of participants and the
outcomes they are presented with. In aesthetic, gustatory and
olfactory choices this has previously allowed us to demonstrate
that participants often fail to notice mismatches between what
they prefer and what they actually get (hence, being blind to the
outcome of their choice), while nevertheless being prepared to
offer introspective reasons for why they chose the way they did
[22–24]. But what about the backbone of attitude research, all
those surveys, panels and polls? If CB held across this domain it
would create significant strain for our intuitive models of
attitudes (in what sense can attitudes be real if people moments
later fail to notice they have been reversed?), and provide us
with a novel source for understanding prediction, persuasion,
and attitude change (how will participants act after they have
endorsed the opposite of what they just said?).
To investigate these issues, we created a self-transforming
paper questionnaire on moral attitudes using a methodology
adapted from stage magic (see figure 1). The participants were
given a survey on either foundational moral principles or moral
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issues hotly debated in the current media, and their task was to
rate on a 9-point bidirectional scale to what extent they agreed
or disagreed with each statement. After the participants had
completed the questionnaire, we asked them to read aloud some
of their answers from the first page, and to explain their ratings
to us. However, unbeknownst to the participants, two of the
statements they read aloud at this stage were actually the
reverse of the statements they had originally rated – i.e. if the
original formulation stated that ‘‘large scale governmental surveillance
of e-mail and Internet traffic ought to be forbidden as a means to combat
international crime and terrorism.’’, it was now changed to ‘‘large scale
governmental surveillance of e-mail and internet traffic ought to be permitted
as a means to combat international crime and terrorism.’’. As the rating
was held constant but the direction of the statement was
reversed, the participants’ original opinion was reversed as
a consequence. Thus, this technique allowed us to expose
participants to altered feedback about their previously stated
attitude, and to create a situation in which we could record
whether they were prepared to endorse and argue for the
opposite moral view of what they stated only moments ago.
Methods
Participants
In total, 160 volunteers (100 female) participated in the study.
Ages ranged from 17 to 69 years (M = 29.5, SD 10.8). We
recruited the participants when they were walking through a park
and asked them if they wanted to fill in a short survey about moral
questions. All participants gave written informed consent to
participate in the study, and all but 18 participants also agreed to
have the interaction audio recorded.
Ethics Statement
The study was approved by the Lund University Ethics board,
D.nr. 2008–2435.
Procedure and Materials
We presented the participants with a questionnaire containing
12 moral principles (condition one, N = 81) or statements de-
scribing 12 current moral issues (condition two, N = 79), and their
task was to rate to what extent they agreed or disagreed with each
statement on a 9-point bidirectional scale from 1 ‘‘completely
disagree’’ to 9 ‘‘completely agree’’ (the midpoint of the scale
Figure 1. A snapshot of the choice procedure during a manipulation trial. (1) The questionnaire is attached to a clipboard, with the
questions distributed over two pages. A paper slip with moral statements is attached to the first page of the questionnaire to conceal the same, but
negated set of statements printed on the page. (2) The participants rate their agreement with the statements on the first page of the questionnaire
and (3) they turn to the second page, and (4) rate their agreement with a second set of principles. (5) When the participants are asked to flip back the
survey to the first page to discuss their opinions, the add-on paper slip from (1) now sticks to a patch of stronger glue on the backside of the
clipboard, and remains attached there. This reveals the altered set of principles on the first page, and when the participants now read the
manipulated statements the meaning has been reversed (in effect, the equivalent of moving the actual rating score to the mirror side of the scale).
(6) During the debriefing, the experimenter demonstrates the workings of the paper slip to the participants, and explains how the manipulation led
to the reversal of their position. See http://www.lucs.lu.se/cbq/for a video illustration of the method and the interaction between experimenter and
participants.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045457.g001
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allowed participants to be neutral or undecided about the issues).
In the first condition we used fundamental moral principles
adapted from Forsyth’s (1980) Ethics Position Questionnaire, such as
‘‘It is more important for a society to promote the welfare of the citizens than to
protect their personal integrity’’. In the second condition, we used
concrete moral statements instantiating the principles from the
first condition, e.g. ‘‘Large scale governmental surveillance of e-mail and
Internet traffic ought to be permitted as means to combat international crime
and terrorism.’’ (see table 1). The statements in condition two were
picked to represent salient and important current dilemmas from
Swedish media and societal debate at the time of the study, thus
making it very likely that participants would have been exposed to
prior information about the issues they were asked to express their
attitudes on. In this way, we could create a contrast between
foundational principles, what many suppose is the core of our
moral beings, and the everyday manifestation of these principles in
current issues, and investigate whether levels of abstraction would
influence detection of the manipulations. Intuitively, we would
expect abstract principles to allow for more exceptions and
qualifications (a feature of abstractness as such), thus engendering
lower levels of detection in this condition.
In addition, we asked the participants to indicate how strong
their moral opinions in general were, and if they were politically
active or not, as well as their age and gender.
The questionnaire was attached to a clipboard, with the
questions distributed over two pages. After completing the survey,
we asked the participants to read aloud and discuss three of their
ratings from the first page (randomly taken from a limited subset of
the principles or statements), and also if it would be possible to
audio-record this discussion. If the participants did not want to be
recorded, the experiment leader took notes and made the
necessary classifications immediately after the trial was completed.
As previously explained, at this point two of the statements the
participants read aloud had been reversed compared to the
statements they had originally rated. When the participants had
read the statement, we interjected and summarized their attitudes
in a question by saying ‘‘so you don’t agree that [statement]?’’ or
‘‘so you do agree that [statement]?’’ to avoid any misunderstand-
ing of what the rating implied. The reversal was achieved by
attaching a lightly glued paper-slip on the first page of the
questionnaire, containing the original version of the statements.
The layout and shape of the attached slip allow it to blend in
perfectly with the background sheet. When the participants folded
the first page over the back of the clipboard, the paper-slip stuck
on an even stickier patch on the backside of the questionnaire, thus
revealing a new set of statements on the first page (see figure 1).
Measures
All manipulated trials were categorized as either corrected or
accepted. In the trials categorized as corrected, the participants
either noticed the change immediately after reading the manip-
ulated statement (spontaneous detection), or claimed in the
debriefing session to have felt something to be wrong when
reading the manipulated sentence (retrospective correction). In
detail, we classified any trial as spontaneously detected if the
participants showed any signs of having detected the change after
reading the manipulated statement, e.g. if they corrected or
reversed their rating to match their original position, or if they
thought they must have misunderstood the question the first time
they read it, etc. Most of the participants who immediately
detected the manipulation also corrected the rating by reversing
the position on the scale, i.e. had they rated their agreement to 1
(completely disagree) they changed it to 9 (completely agree)
(although 10% of these trials were changed to a different number
than the exact opposite). After the experiment, the participants
were fully debriefed about the true purpose of the experiment. In
this interview session we presented a series of increasingly specific
questions about the experiment. Firstly we asked the participants
in general what they thought about the questionnaire. Secondly,
we asked if they had experienced anything as being strange or odd
with the questionnaire. Finally, we showed them exactly how we
had reversed some of the statements the second time, and asked
whether they had felt a suspicion about anything like this during
their responding. If at any point during this process they indicated
they had felt something to be wrong when reading and responding
to the manipulated statements, we asked them to point out which
statements had been altered, and categorized these trials as
retrospectively corrected. Consequently, in the trials categorized as
accepted, there were no such signs of the participants having
noticed that the opinions they argued for after the manipulation
was the reversal of what they originally intended.
Table 1. List of moral principles and issues used for manipulation in condition one and condition two.
Original Principle Reversed Principle Original Issue Reversed Issue
It is more important for a society to
protect the personal integrity of its
citizens than to promote their welfare
It is more important for a society
to promote the welfare of its
citizens than to protect
their personal integrity
Large scale governmental surveillance
of e-mail and Internet traffic ought
to be forbidden as a means to combat
international crime and
terrorism.
Large scale governmental surveillance
of e-mail and Internet traffic ought to
be permitted as a means to combat
international crime and terrorism.
Even if an action might harm the
innocent, it can still be morally
permissible to perform it
If an action might harm the
innocent, then it is not morally
permissible to perform it
The violence Israel used in the conflict
with Hamas is morally defensible
despite the civilian casualties
suffered by the Palestinians.
The violence Israel use in the conflict with
Hamas is morally reprehensible because
of the civilian casualties suffered by the
Palestinians.
What is morally permissible ought
to be similar between different
societies and cultures
What is morally permissible ought
to vary between different
societies and cultures
It is morally defensible to purchase
sexual services in democratic
societies where prostitution is legal
and regulated by the government
It is morally reprehensible to purchase
sexual services in democratic societies
where prostitution is legal and regulated
by the government
To be moral is to follow the rules
and regulations of the society,
rather than weighing the positive
and negative consequences of
one’s actions
To be moral is to weigh the positive
and negative consequences of
one’s actions, regardless of the
rules and regulations of the
society
It is morally deplorable to harbor
immigrants when they have been
declared illegal and scheduled to
return to their home country by
the Swedish government
It is morally commendable to harbor
immigrants when they have been
declared illegal and scheduled to return
to their home country by the Swedish
government
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045457.t001
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To create the most accurate representation of the number of
detected trials we tried to create an experimental context with
as little reluctance or possible awkwardness for the participants
in correcting a manipulation as possible. In doing so, we
stressed from the outset of the study that there were no time
constraints for answering, that we had no moral or political
agenda, and that we would not judge or argue their opinions in
any way. Furthermore, the magic trick made the manipulation
as such radically nontransparent, and thus it was near
impossible for the participants to deduce the underlying intent
of the study, and adapt their answers to please the
experimenters. But at the same time, the design made it very
easy and natural to correct any errors, as everyone is familiar
with occasionally misreading or marking the wrong box on
a form or survey. Similarly, in the debriefing session, our aim
was to provide a sensitive and inclusive estimate of corrections,
by giving the participants multiple opportunities with increas-
ingly stronger cues to report any suspicions. If anything, we
contend, the incentives of the final debriefing question
encourages over-reporting of detections for those participants
that do not want to admit to having accepted and argued for
the reverse of their original rating. Our experience from prior
studies of the CB phenomenon is that the category of detections
and non-detections are sharply divided by the level of surprise
and curiosity experienced by the participants in the debriefing
sessions. It seems highly unlikely to us that participants are
systematically withholding their feelings of detections, while at
the same time acting as if they are genuinely surprised and
curious about our explanation of the manipulations (e.g. see
discussion of ‘choice blindness blindness’ in [23,24]).
As the scale the participants used when rating their
agreement with the moral principles or statements was
bidirectional from 1 ‘‘completely disagree’’ to 9 ‘‘completely
agree’’, the midpoint (5) of the scale allowed participants to be
neutral or undecided about the issues. As a consequence, in
trials when the participants rated themselves to be neutral, the
manipulated reversal of the principle or statement did not affect
the participants’ stated opinion (i.e. they were still neutral). All
such trials were removed from the analysis (36 of 320 M trials).
An additional 13 M trials were removed due to technical
failures in the manipulation process.
All the recordings of the participants’ argumentation were
transcribed using the CHAT format, developed for the CLAN
software. The direction and strength of the argumentation was
estimated by three independent raters, and to avoid any bias in
the classification of the verbal reports, all statements made by
the experimenters, as well as any explicit mention of the
direction of the rating, was removed from the transcripts.
Results
Corrected Trials
There were no differences in correction or acceptance rate
when comparing the individual principles or statements in each
condition. The result of each condition is therefore presented as
a combined measure for the principles or statements being
manipulated.
The majority of the manipulated trials remained undetected. In
condition one, about one third of the trials was concurrently
detected, and 8% of the trials were claimed to have been detected
afterwards. In condition two, the concurrent detection rate was
close to 50%, but very few participants claimed afterwards to have
felt that something was wrong during the experiment (see table 2).
Framing correction in terms of individuals instead of trials reveals
that a remarkable 69% of all the participants accepted at least one
of the two altered statement/rating relations. As hypothesized, the
magic trick behind the self-transforming survey made sure virtually
no participants noticed the manipulation as such. Instead,
detections only took the form of self-corrections (‘‘I must have
misread’’, ‘‘I must have marked the wrong end’’, etc.).
The overall rating of the non-detected manipulated trials was
notably high. Using a 9-point scale, the average rating was 2.8 or
7.2 depending on the direction of the rating, which means that the
average ‘distance’ being manipulated when a statement was
reversed was 4.4 units on the scale. This is evidence that the
participants cared about the issues involved, and expressed
seemingly polarized opinions about the manipulated issues they
failed to detect. Interestingly, there were no significant difference
in these rating averages between the two conditions (condition
one = 4.5; condition two = 4.3). Thus, our intuition that abstract
principles would involve more moderate attitudes, and engender
less detection was not supported by the data. Instead, the result
showed high involvement and equal levels of polarization in both
the ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ condition.
The participants’ self-evaluation of the strength of their moral
convictions was not correlated with correction (and neither was
age, gender or time spent working on the questionnaire). Thus,
participants who believed themselves to hold strong moral
opinions in general were no more likely to correct the
manipulations. However, the participants in condition two who
classified themselves as politically active were more likely to
concurrently detect the manipulations when comparing with the
politically active participants in condition one (x21 = 5.72, p,.05,
Q= .27). Controlling for this interaction effect, there was no
difference in concurrent detection rate between condition one and
two. Similarly, if we compare condition one and two with
a combined measure of correction (concurrent correction,
retrospective correction and reinterpretation of statement), we
find no differences between the two conditions. Therefore, unless
one is directly involved with the current dilemmas (as the
politically active participants in condition two were), level of
abstraction does not seem to affect levels of CB.
There was a positive relationship between the participants’ level
of agreement and concurrent detection, i.e. the more the
participants agreed or disagreed with a statement, the more likely
they were to correct the manipulation. This was true in condition
1 (z = 2.97, p,.005, r = .25) as well as in condition 2 (z = 5.43,
p,.0001, r = .45). Nevertheless, a full third (31.4%) of all
manipulated trials rated at the endpoints of the scale (1 or 9)
remained undetected, which shows that not even extreme levels of
agreement or disagreement with statements guarantees detection.
Additionally, in the dynamic of the magical reversal, participants
expressing a highly polarized view were exposed to a more drastic
alteration of their opinions than the more moderate ones (in effect
turning a 1 into a 9, an 8 into a 2, etc.). Therefore, it is not clear
whether participants with more polarized opinions are less
amenable to change as such; perhaps there would have been no
correlation between level of agreement and detection if the ratings
of all the participants had been moved an equal distance on the
scale (e.g. from 9 to 4, 8 to 3, etc).
Accepted Trials
Equally as interesting as whether participants accept the
reversed position is what they say when asked to explain the
reasoning behind their ratings. From a common sense perspective,
it seems reasonable to suspect that even if participants accept the
manipulated position, they might still tend towards their original
position in their verbal explanations. To examine if this was the
Choice Blindness and Attitude Reversals
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case, we gave the transcribed verbal reports from non-manipulated
trials (NM) and accepted manipulated trials (M) to three
independent raters. The task for the raters was to blindly judge
how strongly the verbal reports agreed or disagreed with a given
moral principle or statement, using the same bi-directional 9-point
scale as in the experiment. For the M trials, this measure reveals
the degree to which the participants argue in support of their
original or the reversed position. For example, if participants
previously had stated that it is morally deplorable to harbor illegal
immigrants, but the raters judge the verbal reports to rather
indicate that they finds it morally commendable to harbor illegal
immigrants, then this would be clear evidence that an attitude
reversal has taken place.
There was a high level of inter-rater agreement between the
three raters for the NM reports (r = .70) as well as for the M reports
(r = .77), indicating that there are systematic patterns in the verbal
reports that corresponds to certain positions on the rating scale for
both NM and M trials. Even more interestingly, there was a high
correlation between the raters estimate and the original rating of
the participants for NM (r = .59) as well as for M reports (r = .71),
which indicates that the verbal reports in the M trials do in fact
track the participants rated level of agreement with the opposite of
the initial moral principle or issue (for an illustration of this process
and example reports, see figure S1, Supporting Online Material).
In addition, this relationship highlights the logic of the attitude
reversal, in that more modest positions result in verbal reports
expressing arguments appropriate for the same region on the
mirror side of the scale. And while extreme reversals more often
are detected, the remaining non-detected trials also create stronger
and more dramatic confabulations for the opposite position.
To visualize the difference between NM and M trials more
clearly, we used the result from the independent raters to
categorically classify whether the verbal reports supported the
original or the reversed position. We classified all verbal reports,
from both NM and M trials, into three different categories: i)
original position; when the three raters uniformly agreed that the
participants argued in the direction of their original position (that
is, for the M trials, they reverted to their original position in the
arguments after first having accepted the manipulation), ii)
indeterminate position; when there was any level of disagreement
between the raters as regards which position the participant
supported, and iii) reversed position; when all three raters interpreted
the verbal report as being in agreement with the opposite of the
participants original position (see figure 2).
The result shows that the NM and M reports differ substantially:
when there is no manipulation, what the participants say is
primarily interpreted as supporting the original position, while the
manipulated reports are seen as supporting the opposite of what
they originally intended. The pattern of distribution for NM and
M trials is almost mirror reversed, and consequently there is
a highly significant difference when comparing the amount of
original and reversed position trials for NM and M trials
(x21 = 126.0, p,.0001, Q= .75). Expressed in terms of participants
instead of trials, a full 53% of the participants argued un-
equivocally for the opposite of their original attitude in at least one
of the manipulated trials.
Discussion
It is easy to summarize the present study; participants express
their moral opinions, then moments later many of them are blind
to the mismatched outcome and endorse the opposite view. But it
is considerably more difficult to explicate all the implications of it.
If previously there was the trouble of stated attitudes often not
translating into actions, now we have compounded this by showing
that moral attitudes sometimes can be reversed moments after they
are announced.
The most obvious suggestion to handle this problem would be to
disqualify outright all opinions subject to CB as not real. Because
how can it be a ‘real’ attitude if we moments later are prepared to
endorse the opposite? Thus, absence of CB could be taken as
a form of acid test for attitudes, a basic criterion for ‘attitudeness’.
However, one would have to carefully consider the implications of
such a criterion. In this study, we made an effort to choose a task
that our participants would be knowledgeable about, and that
would concern and engage them. To claim that half the Swedish
population holds no articulated attitudes about the most visible
moral issues in the current societal debate is a most uninviting
conclusion to draw. Comparing this task to the ‘median attitude
study’ in all the research fields and societal functions that trade in
survey and rating data (which might solicit our opinions about
anything from nasal decongestants, to boxaerobics, to diaper
recycling, etc.) it seems the application of a CB-criterion for
attitudeness would risk a monumental disqualification of current
attitude measurements, and a widespread breakdown of survey
psychology (including aspects of our own published work).
Another option would be to blame the scale instead of the
participants; to suggest that the original rating simply failed to
capture their ‘true’ attitudes. However, paradoxically we would
then have to convince the participants themselves of the validity of
this critique, because from their perspective they often argue their
reversed position very convincingly (as seen in the correlation
between their manipulated ratings, and the scores we blindly
recreated from the transcripts, illustrated in figure 2). For all we
know, had the participants not been debriefed at the end of the
experiments, the attitudes we registered in the manipulation trials
might had lived on to become persistent features of their ideology.
In addition, this suggestion takes us down the same unattractive
path of generalization as the previous one did. To brand our (in
most regard typical) survey as meaningless would create very
problematic consequences for scale psychology in general, where
Table 2. Distribution of corrected trials for manipulated trials in condition one and condition two.
Manipulated trials
Spontaneous detection Retrospective correction Total
Condition
Condition 1: Moral principles 33.8% 10.6% 44.4%
Condition 2: Moral issues 48.6% 1.4% 50.0%
Total 41.3% 4.4% 47.2%
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045457.t002
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far more obscure ratings and far smaller differences than an
average of 4.4 units on a 9-point scale routinely are taken to be of
theoretical and practical value.
We are obviously hesitant to suggest any such calamitous
consequences, but the alternatives presented above are at least
worthy of serious consideration, and it seems to us that standard
models of attitudes would have a difficult time explaining how
attitude ratings could be reversed in the current way [25–27]; but
see [28–30]? What is needed in order to navigate between the twin
horrors of Scylla (‘most attitudes are not real’) and Charybdis
(‘most attitude scales are meaningless’) is a systematic effort to
relate our CB results to the issue of predictive utility and the
attitude behavior gap. Regardless of whether the moral attitudes
we measured were context dependently created, or stored
evaluations inherent before the experiment (a distinction that in
itself implies little about stability or change, [18,31]), a CB
snapshot might capture much of the same noise as is falling into
the attitude-behavior gap, but without the need for repeated
measurements from statement to behavior.
What remains to be seen is how our CB methodology relates to
other measures of attitude strength. The use of meta-attitudinal
judgments of confidence/certainty is exceedingly common in
psychological research [32,33]. But it seems improbable that the
predictive edge we get from this would completely overlap or
nullify CB manipulations. For example, in [22], we found no effect
of the undetected manipulated trials on the expressed confidence
of the participants in their choice of jam or tea, and in the current
study, even at the extreme ends of our moral scale, a third of all
manipulated trials remained undetected (thus leaving open the
intriguing possibility of the meta-attitudinal judgments themselves
being open for reversals). Similarly, how does CB relate to the
central methodological concept of indifference curves in economic
research on attitudes, which aim to find the point where
participants are indifferent between options [34,35]. It seems
highly unlikely that CB would line up neatly with this point
(participants would say some things matter, but not notice
alterations, and say some things do not matter, but still reject
alterations). This suggests we could instead work from the opposite
direction to create a CB difference curve identifying alterations in the
options that at least matter enough to be noticed. Also, if we move
to response measures, classification of explicit and implicit
attitudes often dissociate, but which (if any) factor is the most
important driver for levels of CB? Would we exhibit more or less
CB for attitudes that have been identified by implicit measures
(such as the Implicit Association Test [20]? And would we be more
willing to accept reversals that go in the direction of a dissociated
or congruent implicit attitude?
As the discussion above shows, whatever theoretical perspective
one brings to the discussion, the notion of opinions instantly
reversing through CB creates considerable tension; specifically, for
theories of moral attitudes, the current result seem to give support
for models where moral decision or judgment is reached through
intuition, and the reasons or arguments for the position are mainly
constructed through post-hoc confabulation (as for example, the
Social Intuitionist Model, [36,37]). However, if we really had
moral gut feelings, a form of spider sense tingling for the different
options, it is difficult to envisage why so many of the participants
would have failed to notice the reversed alternatives (it truly ought
Figure 2. Classification of verbal reports in relation to rated agreement with a moral principle or statement, for NM and M reports,
in condition one and condition two.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045457.g002
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to have felt wrong to them). Thus, these reversals concerning both
foundational principles and real world issues suggest that de-
liberation and argumentation (post-hoc, or not) play a more
prominent role in moral judgments than acknowledged by the
current crop of sentiment theories.
Framing it this way highlights the intriguing possibility that it
might not always be considered an ideal to have the most minutely
tuned attitudes, and to consistently notice all CB manipulations.
Even if societal standards dictate a moral ought for citizens to
educate themselves and form considered opinions about the issues
covered in the current study, the complexity of the dilemmas are
such that single-mindedness sometimes can invite suspicion (who
am I to hold extreme attitudes about the righteousness of the
different sides in the Palestine conflict, with its vast historical scope
and complexities?). Similarly, while principles are supposed to be
the very core of our moral beings, it might be something that only
a rigid and legalistic mind actually can adhere to [38]. As argued
by [39] with a simple shift of perspective from experimenter to
participant, deplorable context ‘dependency’ turns into opportu-
nistic context ‘sensitivity’. In this sense, the results could be seen as
unmasking flexibility and openness to change that otherwise would
be very difficult to demonstrate among the participants. Thus,
while the experimenters remained completely neutral in the
interaction, and presented no arguments or support for whatever
position the participants presented, the unique dynamic of the
experiment was that the participants (unwittingly) brought the full
force of their argumentative powers to bear on themselves instead of
others. This connects the current study to recent attempts at
explaining the function of reasoning and argumentation as
primarily being a means of convincing others that whatever
conclusion I have reached is the correct one [40]. Furthermore,
comparing our methodology to the classic debate about self-
perception and dissonance reduction in social psychology [41,42],
CB gives us a novel and simple instrument to vary potential
internal and external sources of inference in a dynamic account of
attitude change. Hence, it would be interesting to see how the
recorded attitude changes in the current study would compare
with actual attempts at persuasion. Previous research has indicated
how role-playing and consider-the-opposite inductions can alter
attitudes [43,44], but in this case the whole process would play out
on an implicit level. Quite possibly, self-persuasion through CB
could be more effective than interpersonal efforts at rational
argumentation (Hall et al, unpublished data).
In summary, whether they are stated or revealed, inherent or
constructed, stable or contextualized, the current study challenges
our basic conception of what it means to express an attitude, and
demonstrates a considerable malleability of everyday moral
opinions. Future studies will determine how our CB methodology
relates to established meta-attitudinal and implicit response time
measures [45,46], and to further explore the role for self-
attribution and post-hoc rationalization in attitude formation
and change.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Sample verbal reports from undetected
manipulated trials in relation to the principle of harming
the innocent, and the issue of governmental surveillance
of e-mail and Internet traffic (all reports have been
translated from Swedish, and transcription notation has
been removed for ease of reading). Participants were
presented with either an abstract principle or concrete moral
issue, and then asked to indicate their attitude towards these on
a scale from 1 (completely disagrees) to 9 (completely agrees). The
figure in each cell of the table (a-h) shows the original rating of the
participants as a filled red hexagon on the scale. In a manipulation
trial, participants then face a negated principle or issue, which is
the equivalent of moving their original rating to the mirror side of
the scale. This dynamic is shown as a dotted red line ending in a X-
marked hexagon in the figure. The verbal report the participants
give at this point is shown in a speech bubble originating below the
X-mark. Looking at the verbal reports it is evident that they
present a much better fit to the manipulated side of the scale (the
red X), than the original position (the red filling). This is further
confirmed by the blue dot, which represents the attitude position
the independent raters deemed most appropriate for the same
report, when evaluated with no knowledge of the original position.
Here, it can be seen that the blue dot consistently is placed on the
same side of the scale as the red X, and much closer to it than to
the original red filling.
(PDF)
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